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THROUGH THE NARROW DOOR: AN
EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE CRITERIA FOR A
CLERGY MALPRACTICE ACTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Come in through the narrow door."' This advice, attributed to
Jesus of Nazareth in the Gospel of Luke, may well serve as good counsel for someone contemplating a claim of "clergy malpractice" in litigation.2 While clergy malpractice claims have regularly surfaced over
the last decade,3 it has been difficult to find an acceptable rationale for
this tort. Plaintiffs attempting to prove professional malpractice liability for counseling performed by a cleric" have consistently failed. 5
One reason for this failure has been the tendency of plaintiffs to
include intentional tort allegations in the pleadings along with the

1. Luke 13:24. The context of this saying focuses on the need to concentrate one's focus and
efforts on the desired goal of "entering salvation." See, e.g. Stuhlmueller, JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY, at 147 (1968). There is an analogous need to present clergy malpractice claims in a
configuration of facts and legal arguments that avoid simple identification with already existing
tort claims and do not run afoul of the first amendment's freedom of religion clauses if there is to
be any hope of achieving the desired goal of judicial acceptance.
2. "Clergy" or "clerical" malpractice is the term which will be used throughout this comment for the proposed tort under consideration. Other titles such as ministerial malpractice and
pastoral counseling liability have also been suggested. For a more complete listing, see Comment,
Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19
CAL. W.L. REv. 507, 510-11 (1983).
3. Since 1980, at least ten such claims have reached trial across the nation. Of these, the
issue has reached the supreme courts of Alabama, California, Colorado and Ohio. See Handley v.
Richards, 518 So.2d 682 (Ala. 1988); Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763
P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (interim ed. 1989); Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235
(1988).
4. Most commentators, both male and female, have used the term "clergyman," despite its
non-inclusive nature, in an effort to reflect denominational neutrality. "Clergyperson" is rejected
by these commentators as too awkward. However, the author of this comment does not find clergyman to be much less awkward. The preferred term in this comment will be "cleric." Whatever
denominational aspects this term may conjure in the mind of the reader are a small price to pay in
order to show respect to the growing number of women in the ordained ministries of many
denominations.
A cleric, for this comment's purposes, is any person ordained or otherwise set apart by a
church or religious sect to function as an agent or official representative of that church or sect and
who presents himself or herself to the public as a representative of the church or sect capable and
willing to help them with their personal or spiritual problems. Such a definition is designed to
exclude lay ministers who work for a church or sect but whose primary relationship is that of
employee or volunteer, and not as permanent ministers.
5. See infra notes 37-77 and accompanying text.
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clergy malpractice cause of action.6 The presence of alternative claims
implies that the clergy malpractice claim adds nothing new to the
cause of action. The clergy malpractice claim can be easily avoided or
dismissed by the court.7 This "shotgun approach," as it was described
by one commentator, 8 tends to keep the concept of clergy malpractice
unfocused, giving the courts the impression that it is nothing more than
9
a catch-all phrase for causes of action that already exist. To date, no
case has advanced to trial where the plaintiff has claimed clergy malpractice as the sole allegation in a complaint. Therefore, it is still uncertain just how narrow the door is that would successfully open a new
pathway for a claimant seeking relief based solely on a clergy malpractice claim. The plaintiff must maneuver between the already actionable
tort claims that might be brought against clerics (notwithstanding their
religious vocation) and the prohibition against judicial intervention into
the religiously motivated actions of clerics found in the first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. 10 These first amendment clauses form the, basis for freedom of religion and restrict govern1
mental interference in matters of theology and religious practice.
These dual restrictions of presently available tort actions and constitutional protections might be construed as eliminating any practical
need for recognizing a tort of clergy malpractice. This comment argues
that there is a need for a clergy malpractice tort. The comment initially
considers the type of cases where plaintiffs have attempted to prove
clergy malpractice in a tort action. Then, it considers possible constitutional barriers to imposing liability on clerics. The analysis section investigates the weaknesses of prior clergy malpractice claims, discusses
what might constitute "pure clergy malpractice" and suggests a "three
ring test" for evaluating whether or not grounds for a clergy malpractice claim exist. This comment contends that there are circumstances in
which it is proper to allow a claim of "pure clergy malpractice" based
on the methods used by, and the denomination and training of, particular clerics. Finally, it addresses whether clerics who are not trained as

6. See e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)(alleging claims
for alienation of affections, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with contract).
7. The courts have found alternative theories of law on which to base their decisions, thus
avoiding the implications of the clergy malpractice claims. See, e.g., Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio
St. 3d 207, 212, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (1988)(finding that the clergy malpractice action was
synonymous with "amatory actions" such as alienation of affections.).
8. See Comment, supra note 2, at 511.
9. Id.; see also Hester. 723 S.W.2d at 554.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or the free exercise thereof."
11. See infra notes 78-108 and accompanying text.
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counselors have, at minimum, a "duty to refer" persons who may need
psychological treatment to a professional in the mental health field.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Interrelation Between
Expression

Secular

and

Sectarian

For most of America's colonial and national history there has been
an accepted intermingling of religious life, including sectarian expression, and official governmental policy. A type of social presumption
that linked religion and public institutions, which can perhaps be described as "Pan-Protestantism,"'" existed as a given in this nation well
into the twentieth century.13 This attitude led the United States Supreme Court in 1844 to conclude that reading the Bible in a privatelyfunded school does not violate the express directive of the school's
founder that education provided there, be completely secular." The
Court stated that teaching morality from the New Testament did not
support or establish any particular sect because the Christian scriptures
were the clearest expression of morality available.' 5 However, some
courts have refused to involve themselves in matters of intra-denominational conflicts. 6 Unlike England, where the monarch serves as head of
both state and church,' 7 the federal and state constitutions of the
United States prohibit government action from establishing a religion
and require that the courts refrain from arbitrating purely ecclesiastical matters.' 8
The counsel and advice clerics provide to their congregation fall
within this sphere of ecclesiastical activity.' Prior to the development
of secular counseling techniques in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-

12. This term is used to denote the religious, ethical, societal and political commonality in
the United States that found root in the tenets of Protestant Christianity, such as the democratization of religious communities, salvation experiences based an internal conversion and personal
choice, minimal use of ritual and rite and mistrust of structural authority. It was manifested in
the general equating of "Christian" with "Protestant" and "American" with "Christian".
13. For an excellent essay on this issue, especially as it affected public education, see, Veltri,
Nativism and Nonpreferentialism: A Historical Critique of the Current Church and State
Theme, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 229 (1988).
14. Vidal v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
15. Id. at 200.
16. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1968); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
17. See Bland v. Archdeacon of Cheltenham, [1971] 1 All E.R. 1012 (Ct. of Arches).
18. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 ("The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect.").
19. See, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good Samaritan or a Blessing in
Disguise, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 214-15 (1985) (traditional pastoral counseling described as
healing, sustaining, guiding and reconciling are all "religious" activities by their nature).
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ries, clerics assisted individuals with personal and family problems by
utilizing their position as a moral and spiritual authority.20 Most-people
found solace and hope for improved conditions and attitudes within the
embrace of religious faith.2 1 Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung acknowledged that the nature of their psychological counseling theories was
directly related to religion. 2 In time, though, psychology matured into
a discipline distinct in method and orientation from religion. "The
mind" came within the sphere of science while "the soul" was left to
religion.2 3
For many years, psychological counseling was shielded from the
threat of legal action based on a theoryof malpractice. Medical malpractice2 4 was restricted to fields such-as surgery and physical therapy:
Psychological malpractice has been actionable only since the watershed
2
was decase of Tarasoff v.Regents of the University of California
a therthat
held
Court
Supreme
California
The
cided fifteen years ago.
apist has a*.duty to warn a third party who has been threatened by
someone in the therapist's care.2 6 In Tarasoff, psychological therapists
employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital of the University of California at Berkeley-did not notify Ms. Tatiana Tarasoff that Prosenjit
Poddar, then under the care of Doctor Lawrence Moore, had
threatened to kill her.27 Doctor Moore had the campus police briefly
detain Poddar; after his' release, Poddar killed Tarasoff.2 8 Because
Tarasoff had not been a patient of the defendants, the defendant physi-

20. Id.
21. Id. It is precisely the nature of the four traditional counseling functions of healing,
sustaining, guiding and reconciling that they support and succor, provide hope and recovery from
difficulty. No other social unit, with the exception of the immediate family, was available to give
such help. Id.
22. See Szasz, The Theology of Therapy: The Breach of the First Amendment Through
the Medicalization of Morals, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127, 134 (1975) (documenting
Freud and Jung's views concerning secular counseling and its links to religious thought).
23. Such a distinction replaces the more traditional tripartite structure of the mind that
originated in classical times and which was used by St. Augustine in his work, The Trinity. See 45
ST. AUGUSTINE, THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH: THE TRINITY (1963). St. Augustine conceived of
this "three part mind" as a reflection of the Trinity's structure of Father, Son and Spirit. Id. at
506. Later Christian tradition developed by St. Thomas Aquinas envisioned the mind as composed
of the elements of Reason, Will and Emotion. II T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 145-235
(Blackfriars ed. 1970). Freud's division of the human mind into Id, Ego, and-Superego is similar
to the traditional forms.
24. Malpractice is defined as a "[flailure of one rendering professional services to exercise
that degree of skill and learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community
by the average prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss or damage to the recipient of those services.. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,.131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
26. Id. at 446, 551 P:2d at 351, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
27. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19.,
28. Id.
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cians contended that they did not owe her a duty to warn her of any
threats. 9 The defense also argued that an action of medical malpractice for psychological health care professionals was untenable because
there is a high degree of uncertainty in psychological care. A substantial risk exists that a counselor might warn someone of possible harm
who is not in any actual danger, causing that person unneeded anxiety."o The court, however, rejected these arguments, stating that a
strong public interest for providing people with protection from harm
outweighs the possibility of anxiety based on a mistaken diagnosis..
The court also rejected any contention that the doctor-patient relationship's confidentiality should be more highly valued than the peril to

human life. 2 The court's reasoning provided the foundation for a malpractice action of a limited scope against professional therapists. 33
Clerics, however, have not been considered liable for malpractice
in the same way as secular counselors.3 4 In fact, in the past, clerics
have been specifically exempted from legislation regulating secular
counseling activities.3 Such exemptions were granted because the free
exercise clause of the United States Constitution is assumed to afford
clerics the greatest possible latitude in advising and counseling their
congregations as part of their ministerial activity.3 Their dealings with
the personal problems of their communicants is considered to be "spiritual" in nature and constitutionally protected by virtue of their religious content.
B.

Overview of Previous Clergy Malpractice Claims
The first major challenge to the above supposition occurred in Cal-

29. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
30. Id. at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
31. Id. at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
32. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
33. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
34. See infra notes 37-77 and accompanying text for an overview of such malpractice
claims.
35. Exclusionary legislation had been used as a primary argument against a clergy malpractice claim. For example, COLO. RaV. STAT § 12-43-114 (10) (1985) (repealed 1988) provided:
Nothing in this article shall restrict a duly ordained minister, priest, or rabbi from carrying
out his ministerial responsibilities while functioning in his ministerial capacity within a
recognized religious organization and serving the spiritual needs of its constituency, provided he does not hold himself out to the public by any title or description incorporating
the words 'psychologist', 'psychological', 'psychology', or other term implying training, experience, or expertise in psychology.
36. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In Ballard, Justice Douglas stated:
"[tihe religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most
people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect." Id. at.87.
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Nally v. Grace Community Church.3" A suit was
ifornia in 1980 in.
filed by the parents of Kenneth Nally, who had committed suicide at
the age of twenty-four.3 8 Nally -had been under the spiritual guidance
of the pastors of Grace Community, Church and had discussed his personal problems with them on several occasions.3 9 Nally spoke with two
of the pastors on a fairly informal basis and had also entered into a
"discipling relationship ' 4 0 with another pastor which lasted for only
five sessions."' Nally was hospitalized after a suicide attempt in March
of 1979, in the midst of the counseling sessions."2 The senior pastor at
Grace Community Church suggested Nally seek psychological help and
recommended a physician and several therapists.4 Nally's parents rejected the advice of a physician recommended by the pastor that- Nally
be involuntarily placed in a psychiatric hospital and Nally refused to
voluntarily enter an institution. 4 Eleven days before committing suicide, Nally asked one of the church's pastors during a counseling ses45
sion whether a Christian who committed suicide would still be saved.
The pastor said yes but cautioned that it would be wrong to think in
such terms.4 ' Nally saw two more doctors in his last week of life but he..
would not agree to treatment from either physician. 7 After a family
proposal, Nally went to a friend's apartfight and a rejected marriage
8
himself.'
ment and shot
Kenneth Nally's parents filed suit against the Grace Community
Church and its pastors, alleging wrongful death under alternative theories of clergy malpractice, negligence in the training of the church's
counselors and ministers and outrageous conduct on the part of the
pastors and counselors. 9 The court of appeals ruled that all counselors
who did not have a professional license, both religious and secular, had

37. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644
(interim ed. 1989).
38. Id. at 283, 763 P.2d at 949, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
39. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100. These problems included a breakup
with his girlfriend and family tensions, some of which stemmed from Kenneth's rejection of his
parents' Catholicism. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
40. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100. From the context of the supreme
court's opinion, a discipling relationship would seem to be one in which a pastor or church minister serves as a mentor to a member of the church in an ongoing, formal way. The term itself is
probably a term of art used at Grace Community Church.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 285, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
43. Id. at 286, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
44. Id. at 286, 763 P.2d at 951-52, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
45. Id. at 286, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
48. Id.
49 Id.
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a duty to refer suicidal persons to a psychiatrist or psychologist qualified to prevent suicide. 50 The California Supreme Court, finding no
grounds for a "duty to refer," reversed the court of appeals.5 1
Clergy malpractice based on harm resulting from a cleric's improper sexual relationship with someone who was receiving marriage
counseling from the cleric was alleged in Stock v. Pressnell.2 The husband of a woman intimately involved with the minister who was counseling her filed suit against the minister and his church. 53 The trial
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for the plaintiff's failure to state an actionable claim.54 The court of appeals upheld the dismissal on all counts except for one based on the infliction of emotional
distress.55 The clergy malpractice claim was dismissed because the defendants' alleged acts were within'the scope of established tort law and
it was unnecessary to recognize a new cause of action to remedy any
wrong committed by the defendants."
Justice Sweeney strongly dissented to the Strock majority's refusal
to recognize a clergy malpractice claim. The dissent is the only judicial expression to date that supports the concept of malpractice in cases
of sexual impropriety between cleric counselors and counselees." The
dissent insisted that sexual relationships between counselors and those
seeking their help are not acceptable by the standards of secular counseling any more than they are by religious denominations. An action

50. Id. at 290, 763 P.2d at 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
51. Id. at 300, 763 P.2d at 961, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110. The supreme court determined that
a duty-to refer required the existence of a duty to care, a special relationship between the counselor and counselee akin to that of a doctor-patient relationship, a connection between the defendant's actions and the harm incurred by the counseled, the foreseeability of that harm, the availability of insurance and the public policy interest in the free exercise of religion. Id. at 292-99, 763
P.2d at 956-60, 253 Cal. Rptr at 105-10.
Such. a duty to refer has been espoused by one commentator. See, Bergman, Is the Cloth
Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 U. SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 47 (1981). Bergman
states:
[SIhould the clergyman, who holds himself and his services to the community as a counselor competent to deal with emotional problems, not be subject to some minimal level of
competence in the art or science of therapeutic counseling, as determined or gauged by the
state of the science or art? May the clergyman practice his counseling with the total disregard of the scientific advances made in that area?
Id. But, see Ericsson, Clergy Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. UL. REV.
163 (1981) (actions against the clergy possible only in cases of actual malice).
52. 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988).
53. Id. at 208, 527 N.E.2d at 1236. Other claims were brought for breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 209, 527 N.E.2d at 1237.
56. Id. at 212, 527 N.E.2d at 1239.
57. Id. at 217, 527 N.E.2d at 1244 (Sweeney, J. dissenting).
58. Id. at 218, 527 N.E.2d at 1245 (Sweeney, J. dissenting).
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for malpractice is not based on a counselor's religious or secular status,
but on "the behavior of the practitioner." 5 9 In fact, the dissent considers the term "clergy malpractice" to be a misnomer because the counselor's behavior, not any clerical status, is the reason for the malpractice action. 60 For this reason it could be argued that the dissent
supports the application of professional malpractice standards to clerics
without supporting a separate tort claim of clergy malpractice. However, the practical effect would be the same for clerics.
61 a Catholic priest enIn a similar case, Destefano v. Grabrian,
tered into an adulterous relationship with a female counselee. The
counselee's husband filed a complaint against the priest, the diocese
and his wife claiming professional negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and breach of a fiduciary duty. 2 His wife later
joined his action, cross claiming negligence, breach of a fiduciary duty
and outrageous conduct. 63 The diocese and Father Grabrian's defense
rested on the first amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion in that the actions in question took place as part of the "perform' The defendants also arance of pastoral duties by a Catholic priest." 64
gued that the state legislature had specifically elected to exclude
religious ministers, priests or rabbis from the penalties imposed on licensed marriage counselors who engage in sexual relations with their
65
clients.
The Destefano court rejected Father Grabrian's free exercise defense because he was obviously not acting within the scope of his employment as a Catholic priest when he had an affair with a married
woman. 66 The court favored the Oregon Appeals Court's reasoning in
Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,6 7 which stated "[iun the spiritual counseling context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the
defendant can show that the conduct that allegedly caused plaintiff's
distress was in fact 'part of the beliefs and practices' of the religious
group." 68 Nevertheless, the court rejected the claim of clergy malpractice, stating that there was clear legislative intent to exclude the clergy
in all cases from malpractice actions, although the legislature's ration-

59.
60.
61.
62.
practice.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 218, 527 N.E.2d at 1244.
Id.
763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988)Id. at 278. The court equated the professional negligence claim with one of clergy malId. at 285.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 285-86. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
763 P.2d at 284.
57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
Id. at 245, 644 P.2d at 604.
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ale for such an exclusion was not at all clear from the statute or the
69
court's discussion.
A third type of clergy malpractice case involves a cleric's actions
that cause emotional distress without an element of sexual impropriety
or physical harm. In Hester v. Barnett,"' a Missouri couple alleged several tort theories against a minister, including ministerial malpractice.71 The plaintiffs were approached by a man who represented himself as a Baptist minister and offered to provide them with family
counseling. 72 Since he assured them that what they told him would be
kept in the strictest confidence, the Hesters confided-in him concerning
7
Then, the pastor allegedly caused
their difficulties with their childrens.
the Hesters' harm by speaking to others about the family's problems,
ridiculing the parents from the pulpit, trying to turn the children
against their parents, providing false accusations to the Hot Line .for
Child Abuse concerning the treatment of the children and attempting
to destroy the family's business by driving away their employees.7 4
The trial court dismissed the couple's claims for "failure to state
causes of action-upon which relief may be granted. ' 78 The court of
appeals reinstated some of the claims, but upheld the dismissal of the
clergy malpractice action.7 6 The court reasoned that, after the alreadyactionable tort aspects of the plaintiffs' claims were removed from the
issue, the only basis for a malpractice claim was the ethical duty of a
pastor not to discuss with others what he is told in confidence. The
77
court determined that this ethical duty was not actionable by itself.
C., Constitutional Considerations
The free exercise of religion clause has more of a direct impact on
the question of clergy malpractice than the establishment clause.7 8 It is
important to understand the Supreme Court's interpretation of the free
exercise clause because the courts that have faced a clergy malpractice
claim have generally raised constitutional issues in the context of the
79
free exercise clause.

69. Destefano, 763 P.2d at 285-86.
70. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
71. Id. at 550. The other counts were for alienation of affections, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy and tortious interference with contract. id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 549.
76. Id. at 564.
77. Id. at 554.
78. The free exercise clause will most likely be used as a defense by clerics sued under an
action of clergy malpractice. See, e.g., Destefano, 763 P.2d at 283.
79. Id
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The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of a
defense of a religious practice based on the free exercise clause in
Reynolds v. United States.80 The case involved the Mormons' claim
that their right to freely engage in polygamous relationships as a religious practice was protected by the first amendment despite state and
federal prohibitions of the lifestyle.8 1 Polygamy was an established
tenet of the Mormon faith at that time.82 The Supreme Court held that
the government has the right to outlaw the practice of polygamy, notwithstanding its basis in religious belief, because the state can control
any action "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 83
This holding was the first articulation of what became known as the
"belief-action" distinction which differentiated between an absolute
right to profess any religious belief and the qualified right to act on
84
those beliefs.
The holding implied a potential chilling of the actual protection
for religious exercise afforded by the free exercise of religion clause;
this implication was limited in a pair of cases decided during the 1940s.
In these cases, the Court held that the ability of the state to control
and restrict religious activity, and indeed all first amendment rights, is
not absolute. 85 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,88 the Court stated that "[in]
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. ' 87 The
Court tightened the states' power to regulate religious activity even
more in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette"' by holding that "[first amendment rights] are susceptible of restriction only to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect."8 9
The right to the free exercise of religion falls within the strict
scrutiny protective framework that protects other first amendment
guarantees.9 0 In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, in McDaniel
v. Paty,9 ' held that the right to the free exercise of religion prohibits
the state from denying clerics rights that they would have if they were

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 166.
See infra text accompanying notes 86-89.
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 304.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 639.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
435 U.S. 618 (1978).
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not in the clergy.92 The Court ruled that Tennessee could not restrict
clerics from serving in the state legislature and constitutional conventions; the state had impermissibly relied on the clerics' status as reason
for the prohibition.93 The Court's decision was not based on the theory
' Denial of
of "an absolute bar on interference with religious beliefs." 94
the right to be a representative in a government body solely because a
person is a cleric, without a showing that there is a strong government
interest in establishing such a prohibition, is not acceptable.9 Justice
Brennan stated the proposition even more emphatically in his concurrence: "[G]overnment may not use religion as a basis of classification
for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges, or benefits."9 6
However, the application of the strict scrutiny standard to questions of free exercise of religion was recently restricted by the Supreme
Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith.97 Two employees of a private drug rehabilitation organization
were fired because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church.9 8
Their unemployment applications were denied under an Oregon state
law which disqualifies employees' discharged for work-related misconduct.99 The state court of appeals held that the denials violated the
former employees' first amendment free exercise rights. 10 0 The Court
held that a state may bar activity that incidentally adversely affects a
person's exercise of religious conduct as long as the law does not specifically target that conduct in its religious nature and the law is constitutional when applied to those who may engage in such conduct for nonreligious purposes.' 0 ' The Court also held that the use of the
"compelling governmental interest" test, or strict scrutiny standard, 0 2
is inappropriate in free exercise issues unless the question concerns unemployment compensation evaluation rules' 03 or it is linked to some
other first amendment issue.' 04 Justice O'Connor's concurrence takes
the majority to task for abandoning the strict scrutiny standard in free

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.,
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 628-29.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
110 S. Ct. 1595 (interim ed. 1990).
Id. at 1597.
Id. at 1598.
Id.
Id. at 1600.
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1604.

Published by eCommons, 1989

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 15:3

exercise cases, as does the dissent.10 5
It is unclear what effect Smith will have on the issue of clergy
malpractice. The impact may be minimal if the holding of Smith is
restricted to matters involving criminal law violations since clergy malpractice claims are civil.1" 6 It is also possible, however, that the Smith
holding will greatly weaken the theory that the state may not infringe
the exercise of personal religious beliefs without a showing of a "grave
and immediate danger"' 0 7 from the exercise of that belief. In any case,
Smith would not seem to affect the Court's former holding that the
state may not separate the clergy in a class based on clerical status
alone, at least when such separation will lead to the restriction of the
rights, of members of the clergy and perhaps even when the separation
108
inures to their benefit.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Weaknesses of Prior Claims of Clergy Malpractice

As the courts have indicated, to be successful a claimant needs to
show how a clergy malpractice claim differs from existing intentional
tort and negligence claims.1 0 9 The claimant must also show that the
claim does not offend the first amendment's free exercise of religion
clause or the establishment of religion prohibition." 0 The failure of
previous claimants to have their clergy malpractice claim accepted
demonstrates the difficulty of proving the uniqueness and necessity of a
new action of clergy malpractice.
Hester v. Barnett"' is an excellent example of the plaintiff choosing to place clergy malpractice among other torts.112 The pastor's actions were actionable through other, traditional tort theories accepted
under Missouri law.113 The presence of the clergy malpractice claim
was superfluous. The same allegations could have been brought against
the pastor had he not been a minister but an obnoxious next-door

105. Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To reach its sweeping result, however, the
Court must . . . disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine."). The dissent's
argument is very similar to that of Justice O'Connor. Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1603. However, the Court also speaks of the enforceability of "prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct" which could easily include a malpractice question. Id.
107. Barnette, 319 U.S..at 639.
108. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628-29.
109. See e.g., Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 212, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (1988)
(holding clergy malpractice not actionable unless clerics behavior "falls outside the scope of other
recognized torts").
110. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Ericsson, supra note 51, at 177-79; Comment, supra
note 2, at 525-42.
111. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
112. Id.at 551.
113. Id.
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neighbor. " 4 The separate tort for clergy malpractice in this case only
expressed the contention that there is a heightened ethical duty involved and that the minister's actions are that much worse because of
his calling. In effect, the Hesters sought to turn Barnett's ethical and
moral duties as a "minister of the gospel" ' into a legal duty to be
moral.
In Strock v. Pressnell,1 1 6 the Ohio Supreme Court was relieved
not to have to address the "vexatious questions that arise in this area"
because Strock's claims fell "within the realm of intentional tort law,
i.e., amatory actions.11 17 While the Strock dissent takes the majority to
task for not accepting the rationale of the clergy malpractice claim,118
it is clearly the case in every suit discussed in this comment that the
association of intentional torts with clergy malpractice inevitably harms
the latter.
Other clergy malpractice claims have run afoul of the free exercise
clause. For example, in Nally v. Grace Community Church,' 9 -the
counts of outrageous conduct were centered on Grace Community
Church's position concerning Catholicism and its view of suicide's effect on salvation. 2 ' The first charge was that the church ridiculed and
rejected the authentic Christian nature of Nally's former Catholicism
and this deepened his depression. 2 The second claim was that the
church's: teaching that suicide did not affect salvation increased the
likelihood that Nally would choose that option. 22 Both of these positions represent important elements of the faith of the members and
pastors of the church. They are an articulation of the church's views on
what constitutes authentic Christian belief and the nature of personal'
salvation. Thus, these positions are completely protected from any judicial consideration of their potential outrageousness by the free exercise
12 3
clause.
B.

"Pure Clergy Malpractice"
The predilection of claimants to rely on intentional tort claims has

114. Id.
115. Id. at 554. This is the term used in the Hesters' complaint and so is set off in quotation
marks here.
116. 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988).
117. Id. at 211-12, 527 N.E.2d at 1239.
118. Id. at 217-18, 527 N.E.2d at 1244-45 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
119. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644
(interim ed. 1989).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
122. Id.
123. Strock, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 211, 527 N.E.2d at 1239.
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obscured the essential nature of the new cause of action that the claimants are espousing, that of malpractice.12 4 An examination of how the
concept of malpractice might be applied to clerics engaged in counseling is necessary if the boundaries of clergy malpractice are to be clarified without resorting to other tort claims. This identification of "pure
clergy malpractice" will necessitate the differentiation of secular and
pastoral counseling. A "three ring test" is proposed to determine when
clerical counseling might have passed beyond a purely religious activity
into a primarily secular activity.
The nature of malpractice raises some immediate problems when
applied to the unique position of clerics. First, a claim of malpractice
assumes that the profession in question has a standard of "skill and
learning" that applies to all members of the class." 5 This is clearly not
the case with clerics. Each denomination has its own courses of study,
each varying greatly in terms of the degree offered and the subject
matter covered. Various denominations use different methods to teach
12 6
their candidates about the theory and methods of secular counseling.
It is not even necessary for clerics of some faiths to attend a seminary
or obtain special instruction. 27 Likewise, the description of "the average, prudent, reputable member of the profession," a standard established in malpractice, is not easily adapted to clerics. 2 I Beyond the
issue of education, the theological, liturgical and ethical demands and
any attempt to describe an average
beliefs of each denomination 2make
9
member of the clergy futile.1
These difficulties in identifying a standard would seem to be ame-

124. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. For example, the Athenaeum of Ohio, the Roman Catholic seminary for the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, offers a Master of Arts Degree in Pastoral Counseling which includes required
courses such as "Theories of Personality" and "Psychopathology and Assessment," along with
electives such as "Jungian Psychology and Pastoral Care" and "Existential Psychology." The purpose of the program is "to assist individuals in becoming knowledgeable and competent practitioners of the counseling ministry" and "to enable candidates to achieve a personal synthesis of theological understandings of ministry and contemporary counseling theory and practice." THE
ATHENAEUM OF OHIO, 1988-1990 CATALOG 43-45.
By contrast, Trinity Lutheran Seminary in Columbus, Ohio, offers "ministry courses" that
are a part of the preparation for a Master in Divinity of Theological Studies. These studies do not
have a strong psychological background. TRINITY LUTHERAN SEMINARY, 1988-90 CATALOG.
Much the same is true at the United Theological Seminary in Dayton, Ohio, which serves the
United Methodist Church. UNITED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, 1988-90 ACADEMIC CATALOG.
127. For instance, groups such as the Amish and the Salvation Army do not have clergy as
such. In the Mormon Church, all males are ordained to the priesthood at the age of twelve.
128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
129. Finding a common denominator between a Catholic priest, an independent evangelical
Protestant minister, an Orthodox rabbi, a Black Muslim minister and a Native American shaman,
even in terms of professional ethical standards, would aptly illustrate the point.
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nable to only two responses - either assume that a duty to refer psychologically sick persons for professional help is not barred by the Constitution's protection of the freedom to exercise religion as a person sees
fit, or decide that there is no constitutionally permissible malpractice
standard applicable to the counseling activities of clerics. The first option considers the state's interest in the preservation of life and health
to be great enough to override the first amendment rights of the religious counselor. 8 ' The second option conceives the right of free exercise of religion to outweigh the interests of the state in regulating counseling by clerics.''
However, these options focus on the religious nature of the counselor, not on the individual counselor's actions in a particular situation.
Both theories rest on the presumption that counseling by clerics is per
se religious counseling. Often, "pastoral counseling" is distinguished
from "secular counseling" by the clerical status of the counselor, the
position of religious faith in the process and the primary objective of
bringing people closer to God, as well as healing their minds.13 2 This
distinction assumes that any counseling by clerics or religiously ori-,
ented non-therapist counselors will be indelibly pastoral in nature and
will use techniques and methods that are purely religious in nature for
ends so closely bound to their faith that the counseling' must be deemed
a religious activity with a religious end. If this were true, such counseling would fall under the umbrella of the first amendment.
But such a characterization is flawed. It emphasizes the cleric as a
member of a class without reference to his specific conduct. The characterization is the type of classification that was attacked by the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty. 33 It also fails to take into account
the circumstances of each claim.
Clerics are not one-dimensional personalities. Often their educational background is in areas other than theology, with an expertise in
some other field equaling or surpassing that of their non-clerical colleagues. A cleric who has education and experience in one of the secular counseling theories and who uses such techniques in counseling another is not acting in the same capacity as a member of th&clergy who
counsels a person using purely "biblical principles" or other theological
tenets.

130.
131.
132.
SELOR 22
133.

Bergman, supra note 51, at 66.
Ericsson, supra note 51, at 176.
See Comment, supra note 2, at 516 n.53 (quoting A. GODIN, THE PASTOR As COUN(1965)).
435 U.S. 618 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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The "Three Ring" Test

By placing the proper emphasis on who is doing the counseling and
the actual use of secular. techniques, a central core of characteristics
can be defined where clergy malpractice should be actionable. This can
be visualized as three overlapping rings that share a common space in
the center. The three rings would represent different areas: denomination, personal expertise and actual utilization of technique.
The denominational ring is important because a malpractice suit
can only be brought against a professional who is acting in the scope of
his profession or employment.134 A cleric who is a member of a denomination which doubts or rejects the teachings and methods of the secular counseling movement cannot, in the scope of his employment, use
such techniques when counseling.1 85 However, membership in a denomination which does accept the validity of secular counseling theory and
method is not sufficient by itself to hold a cleric liable for malpractice
for counseling activities. The denominational ring is basically exclusionary in function; it separates those clerics who, within their theology,
accept secular counseling methods from those whose theology reject
such methods.
The second ring includes clerics who are members of denominations that accept the validity of secular counseling. Those clerics who
have little or no personal expertise with the techniques and methods of
secular counseling will not be able to employ the techniques during
counseling. Consequently, only clerics who have personal expertise to
use recognized secular counseling methods and who belong to a denomination that accepts such methods would be potentially liable for clergy
malpractice.
The third ring represents the cleric's utilization of secular counseling skills. A cleric who is a member of a denomination that accepts
secular counseling and has the knowledge and expertise to use such
methods will not always use them when counseling a. person having difficulties. That cleric may handle a particular problem by referring only
to scriptures or discussing prayer as a means of dealing with the problem. Since the cleric in this instance is not utilizing the skills of the
secular counselor, he does not fall within the intersection of the three
rings. Therefore, the cleric can not be liable for a malpractice claim
134. "Scope of his employment" was an important distinction made by the Destefano court
and must be so in any discussion of clergy malpractice. As the Destefano court notes, any activity
of a cleric which occurs outside the scope of employment does not receive first amendment protection. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988).
135. The determination of such a question would not be barred by the Ballard prohibition
against judging theological validity, since the reasonableness of the tenet would not be in question,
but simply the existence of the tenet.
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arising from the counseling.
. The denominational ring of the test may be objected to
because it
requires an inquiry into the beliefs of a particular faith; this inquiry
may be an unconstitutional foray into religion by the state. However,
the prohibition against state analysis of religious belief has always been
discussed in the context of one member of a denomination seeking to
act against another from the same group or against the denomination
itself. 136 The state should not determine which party is more orthodox.
But the denominational test is not an attempt to gauge the orthodoxy
or the reasonableness of a belief; it is simply an investigation of
whether a generally accepted belief on the issue of secular counseling
exists in a particular denomination. Unless it can be shown that there is
a clear rejection of such methods by an authoritative body of the denomination, then the assumption must be that the methods of secular
counseling are accepted. The burden would be on the defendant cleric
to show that he or she is part of a tradition that rejects secular counseling methods.
The "three ring" test would allow pure clergy malpractice claims
against only those clerics who are members of a denomination that accepts the validity of the methods, have personal expertise in those
methods and actually use those methods in the counseling under question. Clerics who meet these three criteria should be held to the same
professional standard as their licensed, secular counterparts, especially
in cases where the counselor engages in sexual relations with a
137
counselee.
D.

"Duty to Refer"

The issue arises whether clerics who are not trained in secular
counseling techniques and cannot be charged with malpractice can still
be held to a standard of care which includes a "duty to refer" a person
to a trained psychological counselor for treatment. One commentator
answers affirmatively 38 but, as the preceding section suggests, not even
a duty to refer can be imposed on clerics who belong to a denomination
that refuses to accept the validity of secular counseling on theological
grounds. 139 Clerics who belong to denominations that accept such
methods, but who personally have no expertise in them, would not be

136. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1968); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
137. See, e.g., Strock, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 207, 527 N.E.2d at 1235; Destefano, 763 P.2d at
275.
138. Bergman, supra note 51, at 64.
139. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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subject to a duty to refer. 14 0 While it has been suggested that these
clerics should be legally bound to refer, 4 1 there is nonetheless a severe
constitutional problem with imposing such a duty. It would be, in effect, a legal duty imposed on these clerics solely because of their religious affiliation. The only connection between the clerics and the responsibility would be the denomination. Almost certainly, such a
42
distinction would be considered an affront to free exercise of religion.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Lawsuits alleging clergy malpractice have appeared during the last
decade, but the claims have been unsuccessful because they are ill-defined and indistinguishable from traditional intentional tort and negligence actions. Further, courts have held" that these claims may run
afoul of the first amendment." 3 However, it is possible to apply a "pure
clergy malpractice" standard to clerics who belong to denominations
that accept the methods of secular counseling, have personal expertise
in them and use those methods in a particular case. Those clerics who
belong to traditions that do not accepti'secular counseling methods as
valid cannot be held to such a standard. A "duty to refer" cannot be
constitutionally imposed on clerics who are not personally experienced
and capable in the field of secular counseling. In short, a malpractice
claim cannot be brought against clerics on the basis of their clerical
position alone,' 4 4 but must be linked to the type of professional skill
that makes the act of counseling analogous to secular counselors. Indeed, a narrow door, but one that nonetheless can be opened.
Mark A. Anthony

140. Such clerics would be protected by the free exercise clause.
141. Bergman, supra note 51 at 64; Strock, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 220, 527 N.E.2d at 1245.
142. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
143. See, e.g.. Nally v. Grace Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 299, 763 P.2d 948, 960,
253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (interim ed. 1989); Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283 (Colo. 1988). But see, Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (interim ed. 1990) (possible weakening of the standard by which free exercise defenses
could be abrogated).
144. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978).
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